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Abstract—Privacy-preserving data release is about disclosing
information about useful data while retaining the privacy of
sensitive data. Assuming that the sensitive data is threatened by a
brute-force adversary, we define Guessing Leakage as a measure
of privacy, based on the concept of guessing. After investigating
the properties of this measure, we derive the optimal utility-
privacy trade-off via a linear program with any f -information
adopted as the utility measure, and show that the optimal utility
is a concave and piece-wise linear function of the privacy-leakage
budget.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale data collection and analysis is a key component
of many recent technological advances such as autonomous
driving, online health monitoring, reliable energy grid, and
intelligent IoT systems. While these data-driven applications
provide better services by efficiently processing user data in
massive scales, collection and sharing of personal data is
increasingly creating privacy risks, especially with the ad-
vances in machine learning and data mining algorithms. Thus,
developing privacy-preserving data release mechanisms that
jointly consider the utility from shared data with the associated
privacy leakage is key to the wide scale adoption of some of
these emerging technologies. As a classic example, publishing
a general purpose database, or even releasing its aggregate
statistics, may threaten an individual’s privacy, which has
led to the introduction of widely used techniques such as k-
anonymity [1], and differential privacy [2].
The information-theoretic formulation of privacy provides
a general statistical framework to model both the utility
and privacy, and allows investigating their trade-off as an
optimization problem. Modeling the available dataset with
random variable (r.v.) Y and the private/sensitive latent vari-
able with X , the data that should be released, denoted by
U is obtained as the output of a privacy-preserving statistical
kernel (transformation), and can be obtained as the solution
of an optimization problem. Mutual information is the most
common measure of both utility and privacy, whereby the
trade-off becomes the privacy funnel [3]. However, there is no
optimal/universal definition of privacy and it can either abstract
away from the adversarial threats [1], [4], or depend on the
vulnerability of the sensitive data to adversarial attacks [5],
[6]. In this paper, we assume that the adversary is a brute-
force attacker, i.e., it performs an exhaustive trial and error
attack over all the possible realizations of the sensitive data.
There are many examples of such brute-force attacks in real
life, where criminals steal private information by determining
a cipher key via an exhaustive search [7], or checking several
potential shortened URLs to discover active links [8].
We assume that a brute-force adversary performs a number
of guesses to successfully determine the value of private data
X , modeled as a r.v. with finite support. A privacy-preserving
mechanism is built against this brute-force adversary. To this
end, we define guessing leakage, and investigate its properties
as a privacy measure. Afterwards, we formulate the utility-
privacy trade-off as a non-convex optimization problem, and
derive the optimal data release mechanism via a linear program
(LP).
The problem of guessing is a well-established area in
information theory. In [9], Massey proposed a lower bound on
the minimum expected number of guesses needed to find X in
terms of its Shannon entropy H(X), while in [10], different
moments of the guessing function are lower bounded in terms
of the Renyi entropy of X , and the result is used to analyze
the computational complexity of sequential decoding. Later
works, such as [11], apply large deviation techniques to more
general scenarios in this context. The problem of guessing
also appears in Shannon-theoretic cryptography in [12], i.e.,
encryption against a brute-force wiretapper. The problem of
computational security against a guessing attacker has been
addressed in [7], [13]. The practical challenges of guessing
passwords is studied in [14], [15]. However, limited attention
has been devoted to the effect of data sharing on guessability of
private information from a privacy-preserving point of view. In
[16], a sub-optimal utility-privacy trade-off is found by using
the lower bound provided in [10].
Notations. R.v.’s are denoted by capital letters, and their
realizations by lower case letters. Matrices and vectors are
denoted by bold capital and bold lower case letters, respec-
tively. For a positive integer n, we define [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For a finite alphabet X , the probability simplex P(X ) is the
standard (|X | − 1)-simplex. Furthermore, to each probability
mass function (pmf) pX(·) corresponds a probability vector
pX ∈ P(X ), whose i-th element is pX(xi) (i ∈ [|X |]).
Likewise, for a pair of r.v.’s (X,Y ) with joint pmf pX,Y , the
probability vector pX|y corresponds to the conditional pmf
pX|Y (·|y),∀y ∈ Y , and PX|Y is an |X | × |Y| matrix with
columns pX|y,∀y ∈ Y . Statistical independence between X
and Y is shown as X ⊥ Y . For a convex function f such that
f(1) = 0, and the probability mass functions p, q on X , the
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f -divergence is defined as1 Df (p||q) ,
∑
x∈X q(x)f(
p(x)
q(x) ).
Finally, for a pair (X,Y ) ∼ pX,Y , the f -information is defined
as If (X;Y ) , Df (pX,Y ||pX · pY ).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Preliminaries
Consider a triplet of discrete r.v.’s (X,Y,W ) ∈ X × Y ×
W , with finite alphabets, and distributed according to pX,Y,W .
Let Y and X denote the useful data to be revealed, and the
sensitive data to be concealed, respectively. As in [17], W
denotes what the user/curator directly observes, which may
be a noisy representation of the pair (X,Y ). Assume that the
privacy mapping/data release mechanism takes W as input and
maps it to the released data denoted by U . In this scenario,
(X,Y )−W−U form a Markov chain, and the privacy mapping
is captured by the conditional distribution pU |W .
The aim of the privacy mapping is to simultaneously pre-
serve the fidelity of Y and the privacy of X by the release
of U . In this paper, we measure the utility of the release by
the f -information between Y and U , i.e., If (Y ;U), which
incorporates mutual information as a special case, and define
the privacy measure in the sequel.
B. Guessing
Consider the problem of guessing the realization of a
discrete r.v. X ∈ X by asking questions of the form ”Is
X equal to x?”, until the answer is ”Yes.” As in [10], a
guessing function/strategy of X is denoted by a bijection
G(X) : X → [|X |]. Hence, for a given guessing strategy G(·),
G(x) represents the number of required guesses when X = x.
Likewise, for a pair of r.v.’s (X,Y ), G(X|Y ) : X ×Y → [|X |]
is the guessing function of X given Y , i.e., G(x|y) denotes
the number of guesses required to determine X = x, when
Y = y. For a given pmf pX , let G∗ denote the minimizer(s)2
of E[G(X)], which guesses the value of X in decreasing
order of probabilities as shown in [9]. The guessing entropy
is defined as HG(X) , E[G∗(X)], which, from the guesser’s
point of view, measures the uncertainty in X , as it denotes the
minimum average number of guesses required to determine
its realization. We have HG(X) ∈ [1, |X |+12 ], where the
minimum or maximum are attained when X is, respectively,
deterministic or uniformly distributed over X . Throughout the
paper, the guessing entropy HG(X) and HG(pX) are written
interchangeably3.
1We assume that p is absolutely continuous with respect to q, i.e., q(x) = 0
implies p(x) = 0.
2It can be readily verified that G∗ is unique if and only if pX(xi) 6=
pX(xj), ∀i 6= j.
3It is noteworthy to mention that HG(X) as the minimum number of
guesses is not consistent with intuition when |X | = 1 or 2, as in the former
no guessing is needed, while HG(X) = 1, and in the latter, one guess is
sufficient to determine the value of X , while HG(X) > 1. Although a more
exact notion would be HG(X) , min{E[G∗(X)], |X |−1}, one can always
justify HG(X) as the minimum number of guesses by emphasizing on the
need of receiving an affirmative answer, i.e., until the answer is ”Yes”. Having
said that, the analysis of this paper remains valid in either cases.
[0, 0, 1]
[0, 1, 0][1, 0, 0]
Fig. 1. Guessing entropy for a ternary r.v. X . The probability simplex P(X )
is divided into |X |! = 6 rank partitions.
Definition 1. For a probability vector p ∈ P(X ), Let the
rank vector of p, denoted by rp, be a vector that labels the
elements of [|X |] according to their order induced by sorting p
in descending order. For example, for p1 =
[
0.6 0.1 0.3
]T
,
we have rp1 =
[
1 3 2
]T
. For p2 =
[
0.5 0.25 0.25
]T
,
either of
[
1 2 3
]T
or
[
1 3 2
]T
could be a candidate4
for rp2 .
Definition 2. The rank partition Pr(X ) is the set of all
probability vectors p ∈ P(X ) with rank vector r, where r
is an arbitrary permutation of the elements in [|X |]. Hence,
the probability simplex P(X ) can be divided into |X |! equal-
rank partitions.
Proposition 1. The guessing entropy HG(X) is a piece-wise
linear and concave functional (see Figure 1) of pX(·).
Proof. Let X ∼ p, and it is immediate that HG(X) = rTp ·p,
which proves the piece-wise linearity of HG(X) in p. Fur-
thermore, we have rTp ·p ≤ rT ·p for any rank vector r 6= rp,
which follows from [9]. Hence, the concavity is proved as
follows. For λ ∈ [0, 1] and two arbitrary p,q ∈ P(X ), let
p˜ , λp+ (1− λ)q. We have,
HG(p˜) = r
T
p˜ · p˜
= λrTp˜ · p+ (1− λ)rTp˜ · q
≥ λrTp · p+ (1− λ)rTq · q
= λHG(p) + (1− λ)HG(q),
where the inequality is strict if and only if p,q belong to
different rank partitions.
C. Brute-force inference attack
A brute-force adversary aims at inferring the private data,
i.e., X , via trial and error, or equivalently, guessing. Here, we
4It can be verified that by imposing the constraint ri < rj (i 6= j) if and
only if pi−pj+1{pi = pj}(j−i) > 0, i.e., equal probabilities being ranked
based on their index order, the rank vector is well defined. Nonetheless, the
(possible) ambiguity in the definition of r is not problematic here.
adopt a model similar to the cost function-based inference in
[18] by defining the cost of inference attack as the number
of trials which lead to a correct guess. Prior to observing
any realization of the released data U , the adversary uses
the optimal guessing strategy G∗(·) to minimize its cost of
inference, i.e., C∗0 = HG(X). After observing U = u,
the adversary can update its belief about the private data as
the posterior pX|U (·|u), which in turn leads to an updated5
guessing strategy G∗(·|u). Therefore, the minimum cost of
inference is now C∗u = HG(X|U = u). Considering the
average additive gain (where the average is over U ) that the
adversary sees in its inference cost, we are ready to define the
privacy leakage measure and investigate some of its properties
as follows.
Definition 3. The guessing leakage is defined as:
GL(X −→ U) , HG(X)−HG(X|U). (1)
Proposition 2. We have
GL(X −→ U) ≥ 0, (2)
with equality if and only if the rank vector associated with
pX|U (·|u), i.e., rpX|u , does not change with u, ∀u ∈ U . Note
that this is a weaker condition than statistical independence.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we have
HG(X|U) =
∑
p(u)HG(pX|u)
≤ HG
(∑
p(u)pX|u
)
= HG(X).
where the inequality is tight if and only if all the pX|u’s (∀u)
belong to the same rank partition. Alternatively, (2) can be
proved by [10, Corollary 1].
Remark 1. The difference in (1) is reminiscent of the mutual
information expanded in terms of entropies, which follows
from its logarithmic nature. Nonetheless, one can observe
that GL(X −→ U) has no relation with mutual information
in terms of one being a lower/upper bound to the other.
Let X,U be binary random variables with X|{U = ui} ∼
Bern( ii+3 ), i = 1, 2. It is immediate that X 6⊥ U , and hence,
I(X;U) > 0. Also, since we have rpX|u1 = rpX|u2 , we get
GL(X −→ U) = 0. Therefore, I(X;U) > GL(X −→ U). In
another example, let X = U , which results in I(X;U) =
H(X), and GL(X −→ U) = HG(X) − 1. According to
[9, Section III], we can have distributions for which H(X)
is vanishingly small, while HG(X) is large. As a result,
I(X;U) < GL(X −→ U).
A privacy measure can be investigated in terms of data
processing inequalities.
Definition 4. A privacy measure J(X;U) is said to satisfy the
post-processing inequality [17] if and only if for any Markov
5Note that knowledge of the posterior is not necessary in the sense that the
adversary could also get the same updated strategy by only knowing the rank
vector associated to it, i.e., rpX|u .
chain X − U − U ′, we have J(X;U ′) ≤ J(X;U), and the
linkage inequality, if and only if J(X;U ′) ≤ J(U ;U ′).
Theorem 1. Guessing leakage satisfies the post-processing
inequality, but not the linkage inequality.
Proof. Consider the Markov chain X − U − U ′. We have
HG(X|U ′) =
∑
u′
p(u′)HG(X|U ′ = u′)
=
∑
u′
p(u′)HG
(∑
u
p(u|u′)pX|u
)
≥
∑
u′
p(u′)
∑
u
p(u|u′)HG(pX|u) (3)
=
∑
u
p(u)HG(pX|u)
= HG(X|U),
where (3) follows from the concavity of HG. Hence, we have
GL(X −→ U ′) ≤ GL(X −→ U).
In other words, no independent processing of the released data,
U , can increase the privacy leakage.
To show that GL does not satisfy the linkage inequality, let
U ′ ∼ Bern(θ) for some θ ∈ (0, 1). Also, let U = [3] with
pU |u′0 = [.35 .4 .25]
T and pU |u′1 = [.3 .6 .1]
T . By setting
X = U mod 2, we have X − U − U ′ form a Markov chain,
and GL(X −→ U ′) > GL(U −→ U ′) = 0.
III. UTILITY-PRIVACY TRADE-OFF
Having defined the utility and privacy measures, the utility-
privacy trade-off can be written as6:
t() , sup
pU|W :
(X,Y )−W−U
GL(X−→U)≤
If (Y ;U), (4)
where  ∈ [0, GL(X −→ W )]. By the routine application
of cardinality bounding techniques [19], it becomes sufficient
to have |U| ≤ |W| + 1. Furthermore, the supremum can be
replaced by maximum, since a continuous objective function
attains its supremum over a compact set. Also, searching
over pU |W can be equivalent7 to searching over the pair
(pU ,pW |u), such that pW =
∑
u pU (u)pW |u. Therefore, the
problem reduces to
t() = max
p(·),pW |u∈P(W):∑
p(u)pW |u=pW ,∑
p(u)HG(PX|WpW |u)≥HG(X)−
∑
u
p(u)Df
(
PY |WpW |u||pY
)
.
(5)
For an arbitrary rank vector r, let Qr(W) denote the inverse
image of Pr(X ) under PX|W , which is a linear transformation
from P(W) to P(X ). For a given r, Qr(W) is a convex
polytope with a finite number of extreme points, since it can
6We assume that Y 6⊥ W , since otherwise, t() = 0, ∀.
7Trivially, for any pair (pU ,pW |u), (X,Y )−W −U can be constructed.
be written as the intersection of a finite number of closed half-
spaces in P(W)8. For example, with r = [1 3 2]T , we have
Qr(W) = {p ∈ P(W)|v1 · p ≥ v3 · p, v3 · p ≥ v2 · p},
which forms the intersection of P(W) with two closed half-
spaces, where vi denotes the ith row of PX|W . Let Qr denote
the set of extreme points of Qr(W). As a result, any element
of Qr(W) can be written as a convex combination of the
elements of Qr.
In what follows, we show that there is no loss of optimality
in replacing pW |u ∈ P(W) in (5) with pW |u ∈ Q, where Q ,
∪rQr. It is already known that the f -divergence, Df (p||q), is
convex in (p, q), and in p for a fixed q, which implies the
convexity of the objective function of (5) in pW |u. For an
arbitrary pW |u ∈ P(W), we have pW |u ∈ Qr(W) for some
r. Writing this pW |u as a convex combination of the elements
of Qr does not alter HG(·), which follows from the piece-
wise linearity of HG(·), i.e., HG
(
PX|W z
)
is linear in z for
z ∈ Qr(W). Furthermore, this does not decrease the objective
function, which is a direct consequence of the convexity of
Df
(
PY |W z||pY
)
in z. Therefore, in (5), pW |u ∈ P(W) can
be replaced with pW |u ∈ Q, which leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. The utility-privacy trade-off in (5) can be solved
by a linear program (LP).
Proof. Let {qi}ki=1 denote the elements of Q. The problem
reduces to
t() = max
p(·)≥0
k∑
i=1
p(ui) Df
(
PY |Wqi||pY
)
s.t.
k∑
i=1
p(ui) rT(PX|Wqi)PX|Wqi ≥ HG(X)− ,
k∑
i=1
p(ui)qi = pW ,
(6)
which is an LP9.
Corollary 1. The utility-privacy trade-off in (4) is a concave
and piece-wise linear function of  (see Fig. 2).
Proof. This follows from the LP sensitivity analysis [20,
Lemma 2].
Remark 2. If the elements of pX are distinct, it is always
possible to reveal some information with no privacy leakage,
i.e., t(0) > 0. Moreover, if all the columns of PX|W belong
to the same rank partition, no data release can cause any
leakage of privacy, i.e., t() = If (W ;W ),∀.
Proof. If the elements of pX are distinct, we have pX ∈
int(Pr(X )) for some r. Since Y and W are not independent,
there exists a vector v such that i) pY 6= PY |W (pW +ηv) for
8Depending on the transformation PX|W , Qr(W) could be an empty set
for some values of r. Note that the empty set can be viewed as a null polytope.
9Note that the constraint
∑
i p(ui) = 1 is redundant, as it is implicitly
implied by
∑
i p(ui)qi = pW .
sufficiently small η > 0 and ii) 1T ·v = 0. Let U ′ ∼ Bern( 12 ),
and set pW |u′i = pW + (−1)iηv for i = 1, 2. As a result,
pY,U ′ 6= pY · pU ′ , which results in If (Y ;U ′) > 0. Also, for
sufficiently small η, pX|u′i (= PX|WpW |u′i , i = 1, 2) lie in
the same rank partition as pX , which results in GL(X −→
U ′) = 0. Therefore, we have t(0) ≥ If (Y ;U ′) > 0
The second claim is proved by setting U = W , using the
data-processing inequality for f -information, and noting that
GL(X −→W ) = 0.
Remark 3. In order to specify the LP for a particular setting,
it is sufficient to identify the elements of Q. The procedure of
finding the extreme points of a convex polytope is a classical
problem, which is omitted here due to lack of space. In the
special case of W = X , i.e., when the curator has direct
access only to the sensitive data, these points are already
known as (1, 0, . . . , 0)T , ( 12 ,
1
2 , 0, . . . , 0)
T , ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0, . . . , 0)
T
and so on, and their permutations, which are nothing but the
extreme points of all the rank partitions of P(W).
Remark 4. Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of the convexity
of the objective function, and the piece-wise linearity of the
privacy measure. Hence, a similar analysis applies when
the utility is measured by the minimum mean square error
(MMSE), minimum probability of error, or GL(Y −→ U).
Remark 5. Guessing leakage is defined in (1) as the additive
gain in the inference cost of a brute-force attacker. Alterna-
tively, one could define the following multiplicative gain as
the privacy-leakage measure:
GLm(X −→ U) , HG(X)
HG(X|U) , (7)
which belongs to [1, |X |+12 ]. It can be readily verified that the
two theorems of this paper remain valid when (7) replaces (1).
When the adversary is a memoryless guesser, i.e., each new
guess is independent of the previous guesses, we have
log2GLm(X −→ U) = I 12 (X;U),
where Iα(X;U) denotes the Arimoto mutual information of
order α(≥ 0), which follows from [21, Theorem 1]. However,
this does not hold in general, and is only pertinent to the
special case of a memoryless guesser.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Suppose an attacker has access to a list of user IDs that
potentially belong to individuals with highly sensitive job
positions. The goal of the attacker is to discover whether
any of these IDs are related to a person working for a list
of presumed government agencies. Each organization has a
registered domain name, hence the attacker can build all of
the possible email addresses by combining user IDs with
domain names, and exhaustively checking the existence of
emails, which can potentially be used for consequent social
engineering. Assuming that checking a large number of emails
is a risky task for the attacker, they will try to minimize the
number of attempts. Again, assuming the attacker has access
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Fig. 2. Optimal utility-privacy trade-off for three different utility measures.
to the location check-ins of users in a social network and also
knows the exact location of all branches of the organizations,
they can wisely reorder the emails and check them in a manner
that minimizes the number of trials.
Based on this scenario, suppose we are interested in three
organizations, x1, x2 and x3, with 500, 300 and 200 employ-
ees, respectively. Let X denote the organization variable with
probability vector pX = [0.5, 0.3, 0.2]. Considering 100 user
IDs and without any side information, the average number of
trials is 170 (= 100 ∗HG(X)). Now assume we have 3 cities,
y1, y2 and y3, and each organization has offices in 2 of them
(for example, x1 has 300 employees in y1 and 200 employees
in y2, x2 has 150 employees in y1 and 150 employees in y3,
and x3 has 60 employees in y2 and 140 employees in y3.).
In this way, we have defined PY |X where Y denotes the city
variable. If the attacker knows the city variable for all users,
the minimum number of trials is 100 ∗ HG(X|Y ) = 135,
which is less than 170 (GL(X −→ Y ) = 0.35). Hence,
a privacy preserving mapping is needed for check-ins of
the people with sensitive positions, which can be done by
intentionally creating wrong check-ins. This is equivalent to
sampling U from PU |Y , which obviously increases the level of
privacy while it decreases the correctness of location check-ins
(utility). Therefore, we should build a trade-off between utility
and leakage. Figure 2 shows the optimal utility-privacy trade-
off for this example, when the utility is measured by three
variants of f -information corresponding to the X 2-divergence,
KL-divergence, and total variation (TV ) distance.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of privacy against brute-force
adversaries. By investigating the properties of guessing en-
tropy, we introduced guessing leakage as a privacy mea-
sure. We studied the optimal utility-privacy trade-off with f -
information as the utility measure, and showed it to be the
solution of an LP. Unless the curator has direct access only
to the private data, we need to identify the extreme points
of a convex polytope, whose complexity grows exponentially.
Hence, sub-optimal algorithms are to be sought, such as
restricting the search space to the set of all deterministic
mappings, which is the subject of our ongoing work. Another
practical direction is to address this problem when the curator
is uncertain (or even unaware) of the underlying distribution.
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